Definitions of Knowledge — Summary Notes Flashcards

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Propositional Knowledge

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Knowledge that P; a propositional attitude where a subject knows a particular proposition is true. Philosophical analysis seeks necessary and sufficient conditions that distinguish such knowledge from mere true belief or lucky guess.

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Know-how

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Also called ability knowledge, it is practical skill or competence, e.g. knowing how to ride a bike. It contrasts with propositional knowledge because it is exercised rather than primarily expressed in true/false sentences.

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Acquaintance

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Also called know‑of, it is direct familiarity with a person, place, or thing, e.g. knowing Fred. Acquaintance differs from propositional knowledge in that it need not be expressible as a true proposition about the object.

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Justified True Belief

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The tripartite account that defines knowledge as the conjunction of belief, truth, and justification. Each component is necessary, and the classical hope was that together they would be sufficient to rule out lucky true beliefs.

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Belief

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A mental state in which a subject accepts a proposition as true. Belief is a necessary component of propositional knowledge because one cannot know what one does not believe.

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Truth

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A property of propositions that correctly describe reality; knowledge requires that the believed proposition be true. Truth is necessary because true belief is a minimal requirement for knowing that P.

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Justification

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An epistemic condition that makes a true belief non‑accidental by providing reasons, evidence, or other epistemic support. Justification is intended to rule out cases where a subject’s true belief is only a lucky guess.

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Gettier Problems

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Counterexamples showing that justified true belief (JTB) can still fail to be knowledge because the truth can arise through epistemic luck. Gettier cases demonstrate that the JTB conjunction is not sufficient and motivate revisions tying truth more directly to the epistemic basis of belief.

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Gettier Case 1

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The Smith/Jones case: Smith has justified beliefs about who will get a job and facts about coins; his belief that "the man who will get the job has ten coins" turns out true by coincidence although his higher‑level grounds were false. This case shows a belief can be justified and true yet intuitively not knowledge because the truth depends on luck.

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Gettier Case 2

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A disjunction case where a subject forms a justified belief (false) that Jones owns a Ford and then infers a disjunction like "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona," which becomes true by luck. The example shows that logical operations on justified false beliefs can yield justified true beliefs that still lack knowledge.

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No False Lemmas

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A proposed fix adding that the belief must not be inferred from any false premises or lemmas. This condition eliminates some Gettier cases but is vulnerable to environmental counterexamples where no false lemma was used yet the belief is still luckily true.

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Fake Barn County

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A case where an agent in a region full of barn facades happens to look at the one real barn and forms the true belief "there is a barn." The belief is true and justified and not based on a false lemma, yet intuition resists calling it knowledge because the deceptive environment makes the success seem accidental.

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Reliabilism

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The view that S knows that P iff P is true and S’s belief that P was produced by a reliable cognitive process that tends to produce true beliefs. Reliabilism accounts well for how animals and young children can have knowledge but can be challenged by localized failures of reliability like fake barn cases.

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Reliable Process

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A cognitive mechanism or method that reliably produces true beliefs across relevant epistemic situations. Reliability is measured by the tendency to yield true rather than false beliefs, but situation‑specific deception can undermine knowledge even if a process is generally reliable.

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Animals and Children

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An explanatory advantage in epistemology: reliabilism allows animals and young children to count as knowers because they can form true beliefs via reliable perceptual processes without sophisticated justification. This inclusiveness contrasts with accounts that require articulated reasons or intellectual virtues.

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Virtue Epistemology

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An approach linking knowledge to the exercise of intellectual virtues or cognitive character traits such as skill, carefulness, and conscientious inquiry. Knowledge is understood as a success attributable to the agent’s epistemic virtue rather than a mere conjunction of true belief plus an independent condition.

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Zagzebski's Challenge

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A general argument that any theory framed as "true belief + X" can be made vulnerable to Gettier‑style counterexamples by swapping a false belief for a lucky true one. She argues we must tie truth to the epistemic good (e.g., virtuous performance) so the truth arises because of that good rather than being an independent add‑on.

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Accuracy

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For Sosa, accuracy means the belief is true; it is a basic measure of epistemic success. Accuracy alone is insufficient for knowledge because it does not track whether the truth resulted from skill or luck.

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Adroitness

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Adroitness is the agent’s skillful performance in forming a belief—success due to competence or ability. Adroitness helps explain why some true beliefs are creditable to the agent, but it must be connected to truth to produce knowledge.

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Aptness

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Aptness is the combination of accuracy and adroitness: a belief is true because of the agent’s cognitive skill. Sosa treats aptness as the key for blocking Gettier luck, since the truth must arise from the agent’s epistemic competence rather than by accident.

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Infallibilism

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The view that justification must guarantee certainty or immunity to doubt, so a justified true belief counts as knowledge only if the justification rules out error. Infallibilism blocks Gettier cases but is implausibly strong because it denies that ordinary fallible beliefs—e.g. "water boils at $100\circ C$"—count as known in the absence of certainty.

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Epistemic Luck

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When a true belief is caused by luck or coincidence rather than by the agent’s epistemic virtues or reasons, it is epistemically lucky. Epistemic luck is central to Gettier problems because it explains why some justified true beliefs fail to be knowledge.

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Truth‑Epistemic Link

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The methodological lesson that truth must be connected to the epistemic condition (justification, reliability, or virtue) so that the belief’s truth is not merely accidental. Successful accounts of knowledge therefore require the truth to arise because of the justificatory or virtuous basis, not as an independent coincidence.